**Presenting** debate on contemporary and emerging portfolio construction ssues



# CONFERENCE



At the end of the party who will be left standing?

An alternative investment solution for challenging times ahead

# Alternatinethin King.





- The current investment landscape
- The potential role of alternative investments
- Some additional considerations





### How good can it get?

- Buoyant domestic equity markets
- Strong Australian economic growth beneficiary of resources boom / China growth
- Frantic merger and acquisition & private equity activity globally

   a product of expanding corporate profits
- Many international equity markets hitting all-time highs
- Tame inflationary environment
- High yield markets (until recently) very benign credit spreads very tight
- Low levels of volatility





#### Global equity market strength

# Global equity markets: Performance of \$1,000 investment January 1995 to July 2007




Source: Bloomberg. Performance is stated in local currency terms. Hong Kong: Hang Seng Index, UK: FTSE 100 Index, Germany: DAX Index, United States: S&P500 Index. All indices are stated in local currency terms.





#### But Australia doing even better!

# Global and Australian equity markets: Performance of \$1,000 investment January 1995 to July 2007



Source: Bloomberg. Performance is stated in local currency terms. Hong Kong: Hang Seng Index, UK: FTSE 100 Index, Germany: DAX Index, United States: S&P500 Index, Australia: S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index. All indices are stated in local currency terms.





## IMF and BIS - why is the boom happening?

- Plentiful supply of global liquidity, fuelled by low interest rates (primarily in US earlier in the decade)
- Loosening of credit policies by rating agencies and banks
  - Leveraged loans to corporates
  - Credit generally to private sector

International Monetary Fund - Monetary and Capital Markets Department Global Markets Monitoring and Analysis Division, 2006, "Financial Market Update", pages 6-10 Bank For International Settlements, 24 June 2007, "77th Annual Report – 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007"








#### Aggregate market volatility at historic lows

# Compression in global volatility, January 1995 to June 2007 Displayed with mean level, plus 1 and 2 standard deviations from mean



Source: 36 South Investment Managers Limited - GIVIX Balanced Index. Based at weighted average of components on 1 January 1995. Index comprises aggregate implied volatility across equity, bond/interest rate, commodity and foreign exchange markets.





### Why has volatility been so low?

- Low inflation concerns
  - China and India meeting supply capacity constraints
- Shallower credit cycle
  - Central bank actions
  - Accommodative macroeconomic policy
- Wider spread of risk in the financial system allowing banks to securitize and offload risks
  - Financial innovations
  - Credit derivatives

Source: International Monetary Fund - Monetary and Capital Markets Department Global Markets Monitoring and Analysis Division, 2006, "Financial Market Update", pages 6-10.







#### Stark warnings from the BIS

#### Credit-related

- Tight credit spreads
- Issuance of structured products / CDOs
- Vulnerability: slowdown in corporate profits
- Rising LBO activity and increasing company debt
- Ability of banks to offload credit risk via derivatives
- Relaxation of credit standards towards households and businesses (+ excessive residential property exposure)

#### Systemic

- Internationalisation of banking / growing interbank activity
- Unwind of the 'carry trade'


Source: Bank For International Settlements, 24 June 2007, "77th Annual Report – 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007"





#### Historically tight credit spreads

# High yield and Investment Grade Credit Spreads December 1998 to July 2007



Source: Credit Suisse - CS High Yield Index Spread to Worst, Bank of America - BOA High Grade Broad Market Corporate Spread to Worst, 31 December 1998 to 26 July 2007







#### **Credit: Comments from an investment bank**

• March 2007: The currently tight level of spreads in US high yield markets would not have compensated investors for historical default levels experienced in any 5-year corporate bond market period since the mid-1970's

Source: Bank For International Settlements, 24 June 2007, "77th Annual Report – 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007", page 115







#### Danger of complacency – sound familiar?

- Great Depression in the United States in the 1930's
- Financial crisis in South East Asia in the late 1990's
- Failure of LTCM / Russian debt crisis in 1998
- Collapse of global stock markets in 2001
  - None of these events preceded by any noticeable inflation
  - Preceded in all cases by a combination of some common factors:
    - rapid technological innovation
    - rising productivity
    - rapid increases in the prices of equity and real estate and strong fixed investment
    - ongoing technical innovations in the financial sector, including much greater availability of leverage / credit
    - capital inflows (in some cases which suddenly reversed as the crisis worsened)

Source: BIS Working Papers No 205 "Is price stability enough?", William R White Monetary and Economic Department April 2006, pages 7-8





#### Danger of complacency – sound familiar?

- "The historical record provides stark evidence that a preceding period of price stability is not sufficient to avoid serious macroeconomic downturns"
- "These facts are as easy to describe as their implications are hard to deny: price stability was not enough to ensure high, sustained growth"

Source: BIS Working Papers No 205 "Is price stability enough?", William R White Monetary and Economic Department April 2006, pages 7-8



#### **Agenda**



- The current investment landscape
- The potential role of alternative investments
- Some additional considerations





## Growing recognition and use of alternatives

- Investors doing very well in recent years and generating easy returns in benign market conditions
- Despite this, growing recognition that this approach may not serve well in times of crisis, or when markets become over-stretched
- A number of sophisticated investors have made sizeable allocations to alternative investments to diversify away from traditional market risks
  - Primarily sophisticated pension, superannuation and endowment funds





#### **US Endowment Funds**

- 2006 survey by National Association of College and University Business Officers of 765 endowment funds
- Dollar-weighted average alternative asset class allocation: 30.9%
- Increases in allocation to private equity, natural resources and hedge funds over preceding 10 years: 533%, 400% & 336% respectively

#### US endowment fund performance summary, years ending 30 June 2006

Time period	1 year	3 years	5 years	10 years
Number of survey participants	700	656	589	477
Dollar weighted average endowment performance	15.3%	15.6%	9.2%	11.7%
S&P 500	8.6%	11.2%	2.5%	8.3%
Lehman Bond Aggregate	-0.8%	2.1%	5.0%	6.2%
Inflation (CPI) - seasonally adjusted	4.3%	3.3%	2.6%	2.6%

Source: 2006 NACUBO Endowment Study. Comparative index returns assume a year-end date of June 30. Rates of return are reported net of management fees and expenses.





## Why growing allocations, how easy is it?

- Diversification into alternatives makes intuitive sense from a portfolio construction perspective
- Analysis of alternative asset classes is far from simple however:
  - Varying liquidity
  - Varying transparency
  - Non-normal distributions
  - Limited publicly available information on many strategies and managers




## The potential role of alternative investments Alternative Investment Universe: **SELECT's View**



It is possible to gain diversification amongst sub-categories of alternative strategies and alternative assets

#### **Alternative Investment Universe**







#### Performance of alternatives: crisis periods

	Traditional Markets		al Markets	Alternative Investments				
Crisis	Months	Global Equity Markets	Global Bond Markets	Hedge Funds	Trading Funds	Private Equity	Commo dities	Gold Bullion
UK Currency Crisis	Sep-92 to Oct-92	-4.0%	-2.6%	4.1%	-1.4%	3.6%	-2.0%	-0.8%
Mexican Peso Crisis	Oct-94 to Dec-94	-1.2%	0.5%	-1.4%	1.3%	5.6%	2.1%	-3.0%
Asian Stock Market Crisis	Oct-97	-5.4%	2.1%	-1.5%	-1.6%	3.4%	-0.0%	-6.2%
Russian Debt Default / LTCM	Aug-98 to Sep-98	-12.0%	8.1%	-8.1%	9.3%	-3.8%	0.1%	2.1%
Dot-Com Bubble Burst	Apr-00 to May-00	-6.8%	-2.3%	-4.8%	-0.8%	-1.4%	4.7%	-2.5%
September 11	Sep-01	-8.9%	0.7%	-2.8%	1.8%	-2.9%	-7.0%	6.6%
October 2002 Market Correction	Oct-02	-11.1%	1.2%	-1.5%	2.4%	-1.6%	3.6%	3.6%
Equity Bear Market 2000-2003	Apr-00 to Mar-03	-47.7%	24.4%	1.2%	22.9%	-27.0%	14.9%	20.1%

Source: Bloomberg, January 1990 to May 2007, unless otherwise noted. Data is as follows - Global Equity Markets: MSCI World Index (USD), Global Bond Markets: JP Morgan Global Bond Index (USD), Hedge Funds: HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index (USD), Trading Funds/Managed Futures: Barclay CTA Index (USD), Unlisted Infrastructure: Cambridge Private Equity Index (USD), Commodities: Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index (USD), Gold Bullion (USD). Note that Cambridge Private Equity Index performance is published quarterly - for this analysis quarterly returns have been spread evenly over the relevant months within each quarter.







#### Correlation and beta to equity markets

	Alternative Investments				
	Hedge Funds	Trading Funds	Unlisted Private Equity	Commod ities	Gold Bullion
Data period	Jan-90 to May-07	Jan-90 to May-07	Jan-90 to May-07	Feb-91 to May-07	Jan-90 to May-07
Overall correlation to global equity markets	0.68	-0.12	0.42	0.18	0.02
Correlation in positive global equity months	0.56	-0.47	0.34	0.07	-0.05
Beta in positive global equity months	0.81	-0.55	0.61	0.07	-0.04
Correlation in negative global equity months	0.39	-0.12	0.15	0.01	-0.15
Beta in negative global equity months	0.65	-0.10	0.25	0.01	-0.10


Source: Bloomberg, January 1990 to May 2007, unless otherwise noted. Data is as follows - Global Equity Markets: MSCI World Index (USD), Global Bond Markets: JP Morgan Global Bond Index (USD), Hedge Funds: HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index (USD), Trading Funds/Managed Futures: Barclay CTA Index (USD), Unlisted Infrastructure: Cambridge Private Equity Index (USD), Commodities: Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index (USD), Gold Bullion (USD). Note that Cambridge Private Equity Index performance is published quarterly - for this analysis quarterly returns have been spread evenly over the relevant months within each quarter.







#### Proxy portfolio: Capital preservation



Note: The maximum drawdown is a measure of risk that refers to the peak to trough decline during a specific period of an investment or fund. Source: Select Asset Management Limited, Bloomberg, February 1999 to June 2007. Global Equities (A\$ unhedged) is measured by the MSCI World Index. The Portfolio of Alternatives Investments consists of equal weightings of the HFR Fund Weighted Composite Index 100% hedged to A\$, Barclays CTA Index 100% hedged to A\$, 50/50 blend of Cambridge and Listed Private Equity Index (both 100% hedged to A\$), Dow Jones AIG Commodities Index (100% hedged to A\$), 50/50 blend of FTSE Gold Mines Index and Gold Bullion (both 100% hedged to A\$), and the UBS Australian Listed Infrastructure Index.







### Issues with such analysis

- All indices include different types of funds/investments with ranging investment objectives and approaches, plus survivorship bias issues
- Hedge Funds 34% of hedge fund index (measured by asset size) comprises long/short equity funds, many long-biased
- Hedge funds In the months following a market crisis, hedge fund performance is often strong (e.g.1998 LTCM / Russian debt default, HF index +10.3% in following four months and +23.3% in following 12 months) – catalyst for opportunities

Source: Hedge Fund Research Inc., "HFR Industry Report 2nd Quarter 2007"





### Issues with such analysis (more)

- **Commodities** Commodity indices, depending on the provider, tend to have biases to certain markets (e.g. energy allocations -DJ AIG Index: 30% allocation, S&P GSCI: 71% allocation)
- Gold Currency in which gold is stated makes a huge difference in terms of performance
  - Many consider gold by to be a pseudo currency itself
- **Infrastructure** Difficult to find a broadly representative index (either listed or unlisted) that contains sensible data.

Source: Dow Jones Indices, Goldman Sachs







#### **Lessons from analysis**

- Broadly illustrates diversification benefits
- Diversified package of alternative investments offers potential for:
  - Lowly correlated performance
  - Fairly conservative return profile
  - Strong capital preservation characteristics
  - Complementary addition to a more traditional portfolio







- The current investment landscape
- The potential role of alternative investments
- Some additional considerations



#### **Experience** is required



- Specific portfolio 'tilts' to enhance returns and reduce risks
  - Can be taken as a top-down asset allocation view e.g. avoiding credit / high yield
  - Can occur at the underlying manager level e.g. commodity managers with higher allocations to or specific focus on agricultural futures, private equity managers with less exposure to leveraged buy-outs
- Differences between structure and style of alternative investments
  - Listed alternatives are available, in many cases trading at attractive entry prices hedge funds, infrastructure and private equity
  - Offshore versus onshore domicile tax and structuring implications, as well as currency hedging choices
- Market neutrality
  - Important in environment of tight credit spreads and shrinking equity risk premiums
  - Hedge fund investments needn't be long-biased, and can be market neutral or net short as well!





#### The real lessons from recent fund woes

- Key funds hit arguably not hedge funds but leveraged credit plays
- Most investors better off investing in complex areas via multimanagers/fund of funds
  - Professional oversight
  - More diversified (less damage if wrong)
- View that current situation was unpredictable is incorrect
  - Risk signs were there: historically tight credit spreads & high leverage
- Some hedge funds and fund of hedge funds are in a position to make money from credit woes – unlike traditional managers
- Illiquidity needs to be managed well, especially where leverage involved





## Key issues for alternatives diversification

- Invest across a range of alternative strategies and alternative assets
  - Aim for low correlation to mainstream markets and to each other
  - Diversify across theme, strategies and dispersion of investment returns
  - Sources of risk and return should be widely spread obviously not all linked to traditional market sources
  - Balancing appropriate liquidity can be difficult, but is not impossible
- Accessing some of the best ideas can entail:
  - Significant work to find managers / opportunities
  - A lot of lateral thinking and extensive due diligence
  - Challenges with structure, domicile, tax etc.
- Leverage and illiquidity are typically a bad combination in the wrong structure.



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#### **Key issues (continued)**

- Differentiate between:
  - Skill based investments
  - Those relying on risk premiums which may not exist tomorrow (e.g. Yen carry trade, positive yield curve)
- 'Blow up' risk
  - It is not just hedge funds that 'blow up', many listed companies do as well
  - However, underlying manager diversification does provide comfort make sure that one 'blow up' does not cause critical portfolio damage
- Two or more highly volatile investments may actually be complementary and provide strong risk-adjusted returns when combined in a portfolio
- Major challenge for individuals to diversify across a broad spectrum of alternative investments
  - Requires appropriate operational scale and breadth of research





#### Increasing competition

- As alternative investment industry develops and capital allocations increase some areas currently classified as alternative are clearly likely to become more mainstream (the oxymoron!)
- Potential for opportunities and performance to be eroded
- Fight for capacity in better managers and strategies likely to intensify – some strategies are capacity constrained





### What does this mean for the industry?


- More sophisticated investors likely to invest in increasingly less mainstream opportunities
  - Some truly uncorrelated
  - Added layer of diversification, in some cases performance completely unrelated to traditional markets
  - Smaller weight of capital
- Some novel, innovative and unconventional managers exist - many operating in inefficient markets
  - Potential for strong risk-adjusted performance
  - However, different set of risks and different approach to due diligence





#### Some examples: Volatility Jan-00 to Jul-07

 VIX Index (implied volatility of the S&P500 Index) is negatively correlated to the S&P500 Index itself – when the market crashes, volatility rises




Source: Bloomberg. S&P 500 Index and VIX Index (measuring implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index. Data and statistics are based on daily data from 1 January 2000 to 27 July 2007.







#### Some examples: Non-correlated opportunities








### **Summary and conclusion**

- Market conditions very benign, but some biggest periods of market stress have also occurred when this is the case
- A portfolio of alternative investments offers the opportunity to diversify away from some traditional market risks
  - Our view: a meaningful (at least 10% to 20%) allocation required
  - Allocations in practice vary: Hermes (largest UK pension fund): 10%, APB (largest European pension fund): 21.5%, calPERS (largest US pension fund): 13.5%, Harvard Endowment Fund: 38%, Yale Endowment Fund: 54.5%
- Challenges exist for individuals in researching and accessing alternatives
- The alternative investment universe continues to develop each year some of best opportunities are some of the hardest to find and research
- Professionally managed multi-manager funds of alternative investments offer a potential solution

Source: Financial Times, May 7 2006 "Hermes proposes changes for BT fund", International Fund Investment, December 2006, "Dutch allocations to alternatives will likely increase substantially in '07", calPERS website. SELECT calculations based on \$31.5bn in alternative investment management programme versus total assets managed by calPERS of \$230.3bn at 31 December 2006 and SeekingAlpha.com, 20 November 2006 "Learning from the Harvard & Yale Endowments"







#### **Select Alternatives Portfolio**

# Provides a simple solution for investors/advisers seeking exposure to a range of alternative investments in a form that provides:

- Professional management and due diligence across the full spectrum of alternatives
- Access to some of the world's premier alternatives managers and funds
- Disciplined exposure to quality listed alternatives at attractive prices
- A sound fund structure providing acceptable liquidity and regular pricing; and
- Semi-annual distributions





#### **Select Alternatives Portfolio**

Description	<ul> <li>Provides a total alternatives portfolio solution accessing a diversified range of Australian and international "alternative" investments</li> <li>Utilises a multi-manager approach across a range of unlisted and listed alternative investments, overseen by SELECT's investment team</li> <li>Core allocations are currently made to our world-class partners Gottex, Aspect and Baker Steel</li> <li>Offers access to an innovative portfolio of alternative investments with monthly liquidity</li> </ul>			
Launched	> Launched on 1 April 2004*.			
Option	Select Alternatives Portfolio			
Objectives	<ul> <li>Aims to achieve attractive absolute returns that are lowly correlated to share, bond and property market movements over the medium to long term</li> <li>Target net return of cash plus 4%-5% p.a. with volatility of 7-8% p.a. over 3 to 5 year rolling periods</li> <li>When combined with a mainstream portfolio aims to preserve and enhance investors' wealth across varied market conditions</li> </ul>			

<sup>\*</sup> Prior to 1 April 2004 the name of the Select Alternatives Portfolio was the Select Aspect Multi-Strategy Fund (launched 25 June 2003) and the mandate was different. 
\*\*As at 30 June 2007. Excluding the 30 June distribution.





#### **Performance: Alternatives Portfolio**

## 01 Jun 03 – 30 Jun 07\* Performance Net of all Fees



<sup>\*</sup> Prior to 1 April 2004 the name of the Select Alternatives Portfolio was the Select Aspect Multi-Strategy Fund (launched 25 June 2003) and the mandate was different. Past performance is no quarantee of future returns.





## **Appendix**




#### **Appendix**

# Volatility at historic lows, with exception of commodities: Underlying



# Compression in global volatility January 1995 to June 2007




Source: 36 South Investment Managers GIVIX Indices comprise implied volatility across equity, bond/interest rate, commodity and foreign exchange markets.







### Increasing traditional asset correlation



□ January 2004 - December 2005 ■ January 2006 - November 2006

Source: IMF. Note: Calculations based on daily returns. Market volatility in calculated on an average of the annualised standard deviation of returns for each of the listed asset classes and the S&P 500. Correlations are displayed in the left hand chart, volatility is displayed in the right hand chart.









# Robert Graham-Smith Portfolio Manager

robert.graham-smith@selectfunds.com.au

**Andrew Stewart Head of Distribution** 

andrew.stewart@selectfunds.com.au

# Stephen Barbarich Investment Specialist

#### stephen.barbarich@selectfunds.com.au

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**Select Asset Management** 

Level 10

2 Bulletin Place

Sydney NSW 2000

Phone: 02 8252 2200

Fax: 02 8252 2201

Web: www.selectfunds.com.au

**AFSL No. 223271** 

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