

## Form follows function (org structure & investment results)

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M Mauboussin, D Callahan, D Majd | Credit Suisse | 19 July 2016

"It is the pervading law of all things organic, and inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognisable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the law." – Louis H. Sullivan<sup>1</sup>

### KEY TAKE OUTS

- A thoughtful leader carefully considers how his or her firm seeks to add economic value and builds the organisation to do so.
- Research suggests that the organisation is more important than the individuals within it.
- Teams of three portfolio managers deliver higher gains, adjusted for risk, than funds managed by a single individual or by teams of other sizes.
- Informational diversity has a positive influence on performance and social category diversity has a modestly negative influence.
- Researchers find that funds run by analysts deliver higher returns than similar funds run by portfolio managers in the same firm.

### INTRODUCTION

Louis Sullivan, a modernist American architect who lived in the late 19th and early 20th century, popularised the phrase "form follows function." His point was that an architect should design a building to serve its intended function. The concept applies to organisations as well. A thoughtful leader carefully considers how his or her firm seeks to add economic value and builds the organisation to do so. Our focus is on investment management companies.

In simple terms, an investment firm starts with data, which it seeks to refine into information. Analysts and portfolio managers then evaluate that information and identify securities that appear to be mispriced. Mispricings are absolute when price differs from

value and relative when two securities are mispriced compared to one another. Portfolio managers then assemble securities in a portfolio. The goal is to generate attractive returns after considering risk. Organizations can do these tasks quantitatively, qualitatively, or through some blend of the two (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Possible Sources of Edge in an Investment Process**



Source: Credit Suisse

There are multiple sources of possible edge throughout the process. Firms can gain access to better data than the competition or have means to refine that data into information that is superior to others. Other firms may rely on analysis or portfolio management to squeeze out an advantage. Quantitative approaches provide rigor and consistency. Fundamental approaches can benefit from specialisation and identify instances where the rules-based approaches go wrong.

There are related aspects such as time horizon. Some investment firms seek many little anomalies and trade frequently to capitalise on them – think Jim Simons and Renaissance Technologies. Others take a long view with a belief that large mispricings will evaporate over time – think Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway. Both firms have been successful but have radically different organisational structures.

The nature of the client base is also vital. Investors have a tendency to buy high and sell low, which means that the dollar-weighted rates of return for most funds are well below the time-weighted rates of return.<sup>2</sup> The types of clients an investment firm has and how they add or withdraw funds also has an influence on the organisation and results of the firm.

Here is the main point – you should align every aspect of your organisation to support the source of edge you perceive. Form follows function.

This is important because research shows that the organisation is more important than the individuals within it.<sup>3</sup>

Klaas Baks, a professor of finance at the Goizueta Business School at Emory University, used a standard economic model that considered managers and organisations as the factors of production and abnormal returns as the output. He studied more than 2,000 equity mutual funds and concluded that the organisation explains about 70% of the difference between fund results and that the manager was only 30%.<sup>4</sup> While the relative contribution of the

manager and the organisation depends on your assumptions, the manager's contribution is less than half in nearly all situations.

Further supporting this argument is evidence that the performance of investment professionals drops off sharply when they switch firms.<sup>5</sup> One of the main reasons for this performance degradation is that professionals leave behind "firm specific human capital" – essentially a set of resources, methods, culture, informal networks, and talented co-workers – that supports and augments their own capabilities. Notwithstanding the evidence of the importance of the organisation, 85% of analysts that researchers interviewed believed that their performance on the job was independent of their employers and hence considered their skills to be portable.

Academics have looked carefully at organisational structure and have concluded that it is important in determining both strategy and performance.<sup>6</sup>

One dimension researchers studied was hierarchy, defined as "the distinct number of layers of the structure of the fund." For example, a fund with a chief executive officer, a chief investment officer, a head of fixed income, a portfolio manager, and analysts would have five layers. The research shows that each additional layer of an investment firm reduces average performance.


The rest of this report draws on research to highlight various aspects of organisational structure. We discuss the role of team size in success in managing portfolios, how team composition affects performance, the difference in performance between funds run by analysts and portfolio managers within the same firm, and which sources of input are most useful to portfolio managers.

## **PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT TEAM SIZE**

The shift from single- to team-managed equity mutual funds is one of the biggest changes in the money management business in the US in the last quarter century. Figure 2 shows that about 70% of equity mutual funds had a single manager in the early 1990s and that teams manage close to three-quarters of funds today. Further, the members are anonymous in about 20% of funds run by teams.<sup>7</sup>

From the point of view of a fund company, having a single manager run a fund has pros and cons. The pros are that it is easier to market a fund with a superstar manager, and indeed the inflows for named managers exceed those of funds run anonymously. Single managers may also have a greater incentive to perform than a member of a team because he or she is personally accountable for the fund's results. Further, funds run by one individual have higher fees.<sup>8</sup> The cons are that single managers seek to capture more of the fund's economics and take on more risk than team-managed funds do.

**Figure 2: Mutual Funds shift from one to multiple managers**  
Bond safety cushions (1996–2013)




Source: Saurin Patel and Sergei Sarkissian, “To Group or Not to Group? Evidence from Mutual Fund Databases,” *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, Forthcoming, 2016.

Prior studies showed that funds run by teams had returns that were comparable or slightly lower than funds run by individuals.<sup>9</sup> Team-run funds are also generally less risky.<sup>10</sup> The difficulty in completing this analysis properly is the accuracy with which the performance monitoring groups, including Morningstar and The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), report the data.

New research by Saurin Patel and Sergei Sarkissian, professors of finance, corrected this data issue and then re-examined the performance of various sizes of teams relative to single-managed funds.<sup>11</sup> Figure 3 summarises their findings. The highest gains, adjusted for risk, come from teams of three members. From there, there is a substantial drop to two-person teams and finally, teams of four. (The numbers for teams of five or more are similar to those of three, but the researchers found they could draw no sound conclusions because the sample size was too small.)

It is interesting to note that a team with an odd number of members is at the top of the list. Having three team members allows sufficient diversity to entertain and vet multiple points of views and has a built-in mechanism to break ties.

**Figure 3: Team-managed funds relative to single-managed funds – Annual Returns**



Source: Saurin Patel and Sergei Sarkissian, “To Group or Not to Group? Evidence from Mutual Fund Databases,” *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, Forthcoming, 2016.

As they examined the data more closely, Patel and Sarkissian realised that only the teams in large metropolitan areas outperformed the single managers.<sup>12</sup> The idea is that larger cities have higher employee skills and productivity than smaller ones, which create favorable conditions for team results.<sup>13</sup> So it is not simply a team that makes a difference. It is a team that has the requisite characteristics.

The work by Patel and Sarkissian prompts an assessment of the structure of portfolio management teams for investment firms that rely on a fundamental approach to security selection. Prior research of portfolio manager results shows that those who attended more selective colleges or universities generated better returns.<sup>14</sup> While the era of the single-managed fund has been fading for decades, only recent work shows that teams deliver better results than individuals do under certain conditions, as well as which team size is most effective.

We now turn to the topic of how to construct a team to get the highest probability of success.

## PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT TEAM COMPOSITION

Groups are effective at making decisions when the views of team members are diverse and there is a mechanism to aggregate those views.<sup>15</sup> Diverse teams have the potential to add value when the members have different information, the information and models of the members are relevant to the problem at hand, and there is sufficient communication.<sup>16</sup> Promoting diversity within an organisation and managing it effectively are separate tasks. As leading researchers have noted, "To implement policies and practices that increase the diversity of the workforce without understanding how diverse individuals can come together to form effective teams is irresponsible."<sup>17</sup>

Organisational theorists who study diversity distinguish between social category diversity, which is often what organisations consider when they assess the issue, and informational diversity.<sup>18</sup> Social category diversity includes differences in gender, age, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. Informational diversity focuses on variability in education, experience, training, and abilities.

Figure 4 provides a brief summary of the variables for each type of diversity.

**Figure 4: Variables and proxies for social category and informational diversity**

	<u>Social Category</u>	<u>Informational</u>
<u>Variables</u>	Gender	Education
	Age	Experience
	Race	Functional knowledge
	Ethnicity	Expertise
	Religion	Training
	Sexual orientation	Abilities
<u>Proxies</u>	Gender	Education (degree level)
	Age	Industry tenure

Sources: Karen A. Jehn, Gregory B. Northcraft, and Margaret A. Neale, "Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No 4, December 1999, 741–763. Also, Michaela Bär, Alexandra Niessen, and Stefan Ruenzi, "The Impact of Work Group Diversity on Performance: Large Sample

Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry,” Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 07-16, September 2007.

Informational diversity generally contributes to the team's ability to add value because the team reveals and examines different points of view.

The role of social category diversity is less clear. Social category diversity adds value when it is a proxy for informational diversity and when group communication is effective. However, if social category diversity leads to diminished group communication and members fail to reveal their unshared information, team performance suffers.

Researchers used this framework to test the impact of each type of diversity on the results for teams that manage US equity mutual funds.<sup>19</sup> Because they could measure neither type of diversity readily, they developed proxies for each. The researchers used gender and age as proxies for social category diversity and education level and industry tenure as proxies for informational diversity (Figure 4).

They applied these measures to 2,260 teams from 1996 to 2003. Investment teams are a good test ground for diversity because the task is clear, there are a large number of decisions that go into managing a portfolio, and the environment is consistent. They found that informational diversity has a positive influence on performance and that social category diversity has a modestly negative influence. The drag of social category diversity is the result of gender diversity, as age diversity had no significant impact. The researchers found, for example, that a single-gender team would outperform a team consisting of three males and one female by 122 basis points per year.

Gender diversity's negative impact on portfolio results requires some additional discussion. To begin, it is important to recognise that globally only 15% of portfolio managers are women, with a high of 32% in Asia to a low of 11% in Latin America.<sup>20</sup> The diversity research shows that being a token within a group – for example, one woman among men or one man among women, tends to be counterproductive.<sup>21</sup>

Studies of a large number of mutual and hedge funds show no difference in average performance but that men generally have a higher standard deviation of results than women and are more overconfident.<sup>22</sup>

Gender diversity likely fails to add value for a couple of reasons. The first is that women remain underrepresented in portfolio management and hence face the challenge of critical mass. Second, research shows that there remains bias against women.<sup>23</sup> For instance, women-run funds have lower inflows than their male counterparts, fail at a higher rate because of an inability to raise funds, and receive less media attention.

This discussion underscores the point that promoting diversity in the workplace without instructing employees how to manage it properly ultimately does a disservice to all. There is

nothing magical about a team. You must assemble it properly, in terms of both size and composition, and manage it effectively to derive the benefits.

#### **ANALYST–RUN FUNDS WITHIN FUND FAMILIES**


In most investment management firms that rely on fundamental analysis, analysts evaluate securities and recommend that portfolio managers buy or sell them. Portfolio managers, in turn, generally share in the analysis and create portfolios in an effort to deliver excess returns. Analysts are mostly responsible for security selection, or finding edge. Portfolio managers are mostly responsible for portfolio construction, or figuring out how best to capitalise on that edge.

The first question is whether buy–side analysts have demonstrated skill. Some studies show that analysts contribute to excess returns for portfolios and others suggest they do not.<sup>24</sup> Much of this research is based on the data from a single global asset manager.

Gjergji Cici and Claire Rosenfeld, professors of finance, took a novel approach to assess the skill of buy–side analysts.<sup>25</sup> They looked at results for 68 nontraditional funds run exclusively by analysts (roughly half, we estimate, are Fidelity Select funds) at 14 mutual fund families over a decade. This approach allowed them to examine actual investment decisions of buy–side analysts rather than just their recommendations.

Cici and Rosenfeld found that the funds run by the analysts delivered higher returns than funds with similar characteristics run by portfolio managers in the same firm. They labeled a portfolio manager in the same firm as an "affiliated manager." Figure 5 summarises their findings. They also found that the analyst–run funds outperformed comparable unaffiliated managers.

Figure 5: Performance of analyst-run versus portfolio manager-run funds



Source: Gjergji Cici and Claire Rosenfeld, “A Study of Analyst-Run Mutual Funds: The Abilities and Roles of Buy-Side Analysts,” *Journal of Empirical Finance*, Vol. 36, March 2016, 8–29.

What is going on?

First, the researchers showed that some mutual fund families have more skilled analysts than others, leading to better results for the funds run by both analysts and portfolio managers.

Second, they found that portfolio managers who rely on analyst ideas do better than those who do not. It turns out that how much portfolio managers use analyst recommendations is a function of tenure. The longer a portfolio manager has been around, the less likely he or she is to listen to the analysts. While it is plausible to assume that the more seasoned managers add value through their experience, the data suggest that they would be better off sticking to the recommendations of the analysts.

Analyst funds are also smaller on average than manager funds and have lower expense ratios. These factors also contribute to relative performance.

One element that Cici and Rosenfeld do not emphasise but is worthy of consideration is portfolio construction. Analyst-run funds are usually sector neutral. Hence, they rely almost exclusively on stock selection for excess returns. By contrast, manager-run funds commonly have sector tilts. Disaggregating security selection and portfolio construction in performance attribution is particularly important.

## TO WHOM SHOULD PORTFOLIO MANAGERS LISTEN?

Portfolio managers get information from their internal analysts as well as external analysts. Sell-side research, while shrinking, remains a big business. For example, the global budget for sell-side equity research was \$8.2 billion in 2007 and is expected to be 40% of that amount in 2017.<sup>26</sup> How do portfolio managers balance recommendations from the inside and outside?

Researchers examined this question and found that portfolio managers place an average weight of over 70% on buy-side analysts, less than 25% on sell-side analysts, and less than 5% on independent research.<sup>27</sup> The study considered the decisions of portfolio managers of more than 1,000 funds over a three-year span. There is evidence that mutual fund trades follow sell-side recommendations to some degree and that those recommendations are informative.<sup>28</sup>

Portfolio managers rely more on their own analysts as the average number of sell-side analysts following a stock declines, the average error in sell-side forecasts for a company expands, and as the standard deviation of sell-side analyst estimates rises.

When asked about how they use the sell-side analysts, buy-side professionals suggest that they value experience following a company, which includes deep industry knowledge and frequent communication with management.<sup>29</sup> However, buy-side analysts generally have a longer time horizon than those on the sell-side. More than 80% of buy-side analysts said their time horizon was longer than one year, and a quarter of them suggested it was beyond three years. Most sell-side recommendations use one-year target prices.

The reliance on internal versus external sources is relevant to the discussion about form and function. An investment firm that can secure external sources for data or information that add value and are cost effective requires fewer resources internally. That said, leaders of investment firms must constantly monitor the tradeoffs between in-house and external input into the investment process.

## CONCLUSION

It is a challenge for active money managers to generate excess returns. Central to developing the skill to do so is a process that identifies and exploits market mispricings. There are many possible ways of finding edge, from the short-term signal that Renaissance Technologies gathers to the long-term value that Berkshire Hathaway seeks. But in all cases, it is essential to align resources – people, process, and capital – to serve the source of edge. In other words, consider how to achieve the objective and consider how to organise the firm to do so most effectively.

An honest appraisal of most investment firms reveals at least some mismatch between form and function, if for no other reason than organisational inertia. This report shares academic

research that may shed some light on what works. Teams of the proper size and construction can outperform single managers. Analyst-run funds can outperform portfolio manager-run funds, especially if the managers stop heeding the analysts. And the trade-off between internal and external sources of information relies on what your firm needs and values.

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*Michael J. Mauboussin is a Managing Director and Head of Global Financial Strategies at [Credit Suisse](#). He is the author of three books, including *More Than You Know: Finding Financial Wisdom in Unconventional Places*, named in the *The 100 Best Business Books of All Time* by 800-CEO-Read. Michael has been an adjunct professor of finance at Columbia Business School since 1993, and received the Dean's Award for Teaching Excellence in 2009. He is also chairman of the board of trustees of the Santa Fe Institute, a leading center for multi-disciplinary research in complex systems theory.*

*Dan Callahan, CFA, is a Vice President of Credit Suisse in the Investment Banking division, based in New York.*

*Darius Majd is Global Financial Strategies Analyst with Credit Suisse.*

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